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After the terrorist attack on the USA on 
September 11th, 2001, it became obvious that 
means of transport can be used very effectively 
as the means of committing terrorist attacks. 
The surface area of the earth is covered by 
71% water, that of which 96.5% is sea water. 
One particularly interesting thing about this 
subject is that the oceans are actually the 
routes of world trade, and any disruption in this 
domain can be harmful2. However, terrorists 
are also aware of this fact. Counterterrorist 
experts argue that the maritime transport will be 
                     
1 Tonći Prodan, PhD, Portus et Navem Split, e-mail: 
tprodanportnav@gmail.com 
2 Maritime traffic is the bloodstream of Europe’s prosperity, 
and the production of energy and transport, fisheries, the 
environment and climate change - they all depend and are 
of close relation with maritime safety, in one way or the 

















































                    
the first upcoming major terrorist target3.  
Taking into account this information, we have 
decided to do this (empirical) research aimed at 
studying the contemporary phenomenon of 
maritime terrorism within its real life context4. 
The phenomenon of maritime terrorism and the 
resilience of critical maritime infrastructure will 
therefore be viewed holistically in this paper in 
order to understand the overall context of the 
phenomenon. Thus, we will be able to 
determine the best real risk5of maritime terrorist 
attacks that can lead to complex and long 
lasting and negative consequences, some in 
particular being: on national critical 
infrastructure, by operating on maritime 
transport routes, energy installations, the 
communication industry, financial and 
administrative structures, and the overall values 
that support the sustainable development of 
maritime studies. How likely a specific terrorist 
attack is to occur can be evaluated through a 
wide range of different methods; however their 
detailed analysis goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Major terrorist targets in maritime affairs 
Major terrorist targets in maritime affairs can be: 
sea ports, ships, bridges, oil and gas platforms.  
 
3 It is mentioned in the Al- Qaeda manual, among 10 others, 
as desirable targets for seaports (WorldNetDaily, 2003). 
4 With this method (qualitative) research has dealt with more 
concrete cases (Yin, 2007). As an analytical technique, time 
series analysis and case comparison synthesis were used. 
Regarding the compositional structure of work, we mostly 
used a comparative structure. 
5 Risk is the result of threats with adverse effects on the 




































                    
In and around sea ports, there are a number of 
vulnerable facilities, installations, and critical 
infrastructures such as: navigation 
infrastructure, cranes, berths, pipelines, 
railways, bridges, roads, water supply systems, 
fuel storage and hazardous cargoes, container 
terminals, pilot ships and more. Bridges are 
particularly vulnerable to explosives or 
explosives associated with chemical-biological 
agents. Al-Qaeda has been known for, among 
others, targeting the Brooklyn bridge in New 
York City and the Golden Gate bridge in San 
Francisco (Goslin, 2008). 
Furthermore, all types of ships may be terrorist 
targets, the most interesting being war ships, 
supertankers, and passenger ships, due to the 
fact that the most damage can be done with 
attacks on these types of ships.  
The attack on the US naval warship USS COLE 
in the seaport of Aden, Yemenin the year 2000 
showed that terrorists do not withstand from 
attacks on the best defended and most 
dangerous naval ships6.They also showed that 
they are ready and able to attack the world’s 
strongest military force. In that attack, 17 crew 
members were killed, 42 injured, although the 
ship had taken all the necessary precautionary 
measures. 
The next vulnerable category of sea ships 
which represent attractive targets for terrorists 
are tankers. By attacking tankers terrorists are 
 
6 Al Nashiri as Bin Laden’s then Chief Operation Officer in the 
Persian gulf and Yemen set up a suicide attack on the 
American USS Cole in October of 2000, just like an 
identical attempt 9 months earlier on the USS Sullivans, 
which did not succeed because the suicide boat sunk due 
to overburdening of explosives. 
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able to achieve higher goals: incur human and 
material damage, lead to disruption in energy 
supplies, and pollute the marine environment. 
An attack like that happened in 2002 not far 
from the Ash Shihr oil terminal in Yemen, during 
the time of the terrorist attack on tanker 
Limburg. On that occasion, one crew member 
was killed and 90,000 barrels of oil went into 














































Figure 1. USS Cole after the terrorist attack, 
2000  
 





































                    
Passenger ships and ferries are the next 
attractive terrorist target because there are a 
large number of people in a small area. By 
attacking these kind of targets, the goal of 
terrorist organizations are attained, those being 
causing as much human losses as possible and 
gaining more media attention. An attack like this 
took place in 2004, by the organized terrorist 
group Abu Sayyaf, the target being the 
Superferry 14 Filipino ship. In this attack, which 
completely shocked Filipino authorities, there 
was a death toll of 116 people, and 300 
injuries7. 
 
Figure 3. Superferry 14 after the terrorist attack, 
2004 
An attractive target for terrorist attacks would 
also be oil and gas platforms, because an 
 
7 The Philippine governments were in a state of denial about 
terrorist threats, and due such bad judgments this disaster 
occurred. The United States, joined by Australia and Great 
Britain, quietly warned the Philippine government that they 
did not do enough to break terrorist groups within the 
country. (Manalo, Eusaquito P.,2004:61). Contrary to the 
aforementioned approach of “state of denial”, terroristic 















































                    
attack on such “soft”targets also achieves 
certain goals: a large number of human 
casualties and large material damage; 
damages to the marine environment and 
disruption in energy supplies.  
Certain circumstances indicate that is the 
reason behind the oil platform of Piper Alpha 
becoming a target. At the beginning of the 
official investigation, it was discovered that a 
year before the accident (in autumn of 1987), 
Piper Alpha discovered an attempted sabotage 
that had been denied at the last moment. The 
sabotage was discovered just prior to the gas 
being released from the field. This is a very 
indicative and tragic case which took place on 
July 6th, 1988 in the North Sea, 200km from the 
Northeastern coast of Scotland. At that time, an 
entire series of successive explosions and fires 
occurred on this oil platform with 230 
employees of the American oil company named 
Occidental Oil. In this tragedy, 167 casualties 
occurred (including 2 members of the rescue 
crew), and the platform was completely 
destroyed8.   
 




































                    
 
Figure 4. Oil platform Piper Alpha after the 
explosions and fires, 1998 
In addition to ships, suitable targets for naval 
terrorist attacks could also be fuel warehouses 
and dangerous heavy loads regularly located in 
or near seaports9. In many countries, such 
warehouses are considered critical 
infrastructures.  
Terrorist attacks on these warehouses can 
cause significant human, material and 
environmental damage, and therefore require 
good security.  
 
9 Port security in a country or its insecurity relies heavily on 
the grace and weakness of an organization and functionality 
of a port security system or lack thereof in another country. 
Canada admitted, amongst many other Western 
governments, that their ports and associated facilities are 
“perverted” to organized crime. Furthermore, it is common 
knowledge that the USA invest in the safety of the country 
and its citizens, especially following the terroristic attack on 
September 11th, 2001. However, analysis of available 
literature suggests that the safety program of American 
ports still has not achieved the planned results in the form 
of real improvement of port security. 
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To illustrate the possible consequences of such 
accidents on objects of maritime critical 
infrastructure, we provide an example of the 
explosion, sinking and subsequent fire of the 
ExxonMobile 60 meter long B-125 bunker fuel 
tank at Arthur Kill (Staten Island, in the Gulf 
across New York City business center).  At the 
time of the explosions on the barges there were 
just over 7.5 million liters of fuel. Two crew 
members were killed, and one person was 
injured. Only rapid fire-fighting interventions had 
prevented explosions and fires from reaching 
nearby large tanks at the oil terminal, having a 
capacity of about 380 million liters of liquid 
petroleum products, with a massive amount of 













































The effects of the wave from the blast of an 
explosion have left the effects to a radius of 
almost 5km around the center of the explosion. 
The explosion also resulted in panic as a result 
of speculation of another possible terrorist 
attack on New York. 
 




































                    
Understanding the dangers of Maritime terrorism  
The best insight to the real threats of maritime 
terrorism is an analysis of organizational 
structure, tactics and techniques which used by 
certain terrorist organizations. The Sri Lankan 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) are a 
good example of a highly organized terrorist 
organization which specializes in maritime 
attacks. In their organization they have: 
maritime fighting units, submarine destruction 
teams, attack groups of marine tigers, naval 
and shipbuilding departments, radar and 
telecommunication departments, marine 
armaments departments, naval schools and 
academies, reconnaissance units, political, 
financial and propaganda departments, 
maritime logistics, intelligence departments and 
the maritime register.  
We further outline which tactics and techniques 
are used by some of the terrorist organizations 
that have been carrying out terrorism offshore 
acts so far.  
(1) Maritime terrorist tactics and 
techniques of the Tamil Tigers: 
• Blowing up ships filled with 
explosives near war10, trade 
and passenger ships 
 
10 Prior to arriving in Aden for its short supply of fuel, USS 
Cole, like all American ships visiting, was required to 
implement the Protection Force Plan for a visit. This plan 
was approved by senior US military authorities, and was 
conducted during a ship visit. According to the plan, USS 
Cole was under threat of “Bravo” at the time of the attack, 
raising the alertness of possible terrorist attacks. This state 
of threat includes steps specifically designed to protect 
against the impact of small ships. (Perl &O’Rourke, 2001: 
CRS-2). Drawing parallel to the international regulations 















































                                            
• Blowing up ships filled with 
explosives inside of sea ports. 
• Using large boats, including 
tankers, for ramminginto smaller 
ships 
• Using submarines to hit ships, 
including air cargo carrying 
ships 
• Use of underwater destruction 
teams to destroy ships  
• Grounding and sinking ships in 
narrow canals 
(2) Maritime terrorist tactics and 
techniques of Al-Qaeda: 
• Attacking vulnerable ships at 
sea11 
• Blowing up medium sized ships 
in ports 
• Attacking vulnerable, large 
freight carriers (supertankers) 
from the air by small explosive 
powered aircraft 
Croatian legal regulations (Article 15 of the Maritime and 
Naval Safeguards Act N.N. 124/09 and 59/12), the 
commander and other crew members of the ship are 
obliged to operate in accordance with the ship safety 
precautionary plan and degree of safety protection in force 
at each port.. 
11 Cruise ships and passenger ferries are, among other 
things, particularly vulnerable in this regard, because they 
are populated by a large number of people who are limited 



































  • Underwater attacks by divers or 
suicide destruction teams using 
limpet mines 
 
Al-Qaeda encourages the recruitment of agents 
working as “employees at borders, and air and 
sea ports”. (WorldNetDaily, 2003) 
(3) Maritime terrorist tactics and 
techniques of Jemaah Islamic 
(JI): 
• The main element of this 
terrorist organization is: 
Unauthorized access to ships 
and port facilities for the 
purpose of placing explosives 
 
The above mentioned tactics and techniques of 
the terrorist organizations show all possible 
deadliness of terrorist attacks in the maritime 
domain, and show possible scenarios.  
Maritime terrorism can also be committed in 
many other ways that are often difficult to detect 
and prevent. A possible scenario is the theft of 
a ship by a foreign terrorist organization with 
which a terrorist attack may then occur. 
Furthermore, terrorist organizations can register 
their ships under flags of convenience because 
there are much less controls there, making it 
more difficult to detect terrorist activities. The 
next way is the purchase and use of legitimate 
shipping companies by terrorist organizations 
whose ships can load explosives and hit other 
vessels, port facilities, critical infrastructure 
facilities, or densely populated town centers on 
the seashore. Also, tankers or ships carrying 















































                    
weapons and naval vessels, oil platforms, large 
seaports, coastal stockpiles, power plants, 
bridges can be the ideal targets for such 
attacks. One of the most intimidating terrorist 
threats to maritime security includes terrorist 
smuggling and/or activation of explosives or 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 
general, and in particular the dirty bombs which 
can be brought into containers in any sovereign 
state.  
ISPS RULES 
Following the terrorist attack on the USA on 
September 11th, 2001, the security situation 
changed significantly and under such 
circumstances it was important to bring 
effective legal regulations for the protection of 
naval ships and ports. In response to this 
terrorist attack which shook the world, the 
International Ship and Port Security Code 
(ISPS) came into effect on July 1st, 2004. The 
ISPS Code is part of the Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention12(SOLAS, 1974) and is binding on 
148 SOLAS contracting parties.  
The Code, with some exceptions, refers to 
passenger ships, cargo ships of more than 500 
GT in international navigation, mobile offshore 
facilities for exploration and exploitation of the 
underwater, harbors and port operational areas 
in which the said categories of ships comply. 
Aboard ships, in shipping companies and in 
 
12 The existing Chapter XI of SOLAS was amended in 
Chapter XI-1. The new chapter XI-2 was established on the 
basis of special measures to improve maritime safety. Part 
A of the ISPS code contains mandatory requirements 
regarding the revised provisions of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, 





































                    
seaports, the function of a security officer is 
introduced. The Code contains a number of 
other security requirements pertaining to 
governments, port authorities and shipping, 
along with a series of guidelines on how to 
meet these needs. This regulation also 
introduces recognized port security 
organizations that deal with port security 
assessment and the adoption of port security 
plans and other port security issues. The Portus 
et Navem company from Split, which as a 
panelist participated in the work of the Second 
Zagreb Security Forum and whose director is 
the author of this text, is one of the currently 3 
recognized security organizations (RSO) for 
port security in the Republic of Croatia. 
In order to determine if the number of terrorist 
offences in the maritime sector decreased after 
the introduction of the ISPS Code, we 
conducted an analysis of the number of terrorist 
attacks committed before and after the Code 
was introduced; the following results were 
achieved. From 1970 to 2004, 212 terrorist 
attacks were committed at sea13, averaging at 8 
attacks per year.  
Since the introduction of the Code, to the end of 
2015 (2004-2015), 94 terrorist acts14 have been 
committed in maritime affairs, averaging 6 
attacks per year. Although since the 
introduction of the ISPS Code the number of 
terrorist attacks has decreased, the danger of 
terrorist threats is still very high.  
 
















































                    
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
has highlighted some of the remaining 
challenges for the ISPS Code: 
(1) Lack of National Laws/Guidelines on 
the implementation of the ISPS 
Code 
(2) The ISPS Code serves as a means 
to address all maritime security 
threats 
(3) Deciding on appropriate risk 
assessment methodology15 
(4) Spreading good security practices in 
seaports 
(5)  Who controls controllers? 
(6) The ships face difficulties after 
visiting a high risk port (Shipping 
and Offshore, 2014). 
These needs and disadvantages clearly 
indicate that further work needs to be done on 
the development of the ISPS Code, its better 
implementation and enforcement control.  
The consequences of maritime terrorist acts  
As we have seen, a large number of terrorist 
acts are committed in maritime affairs. 
Terrorists are aware of the fact that the attack 
on a large port area can paralyze national 
economies, significantly affect the world’s stock 
markets and cause significant losses and 
possible long-term damage to the environment. 
 
15 Only a model based on the concrete event of terrorism can 
provide insight to whether the changes in assumptions or 
the actual level of threats, vulnerabilities, and 




































  Maritime terrorism is therefore the reality of 
today and is directly related to: loss of human 
life; great economic damage to the critical 
infrastructure, the cities, countries and regions 
where it happens, the world economy; 
disturbances in production, storage and supply 
of energy; ecological incidents with long term 
direct and indirect consequences. Maritime 
traffic is the bloodstream of Europe’s prosperity, 
and the production of energy and transport, 
fisheries, the environment and climate change - 
all depend closely on maritime security, in one 
way or another (Drent et al 2013). The use of all 
EU instruments within a comprehensive 
approach enables Europe to effectively tackle 
marine and maritime security threats at sea, 
tackle the causes and restore good 
governance. The EU’s response may relate, 
inter alia, to EU political and economic activities 
as well as to the development of co-operation, 
together with the security sector reform, the 
building of regional maritime capacities and 
maritime missions and EU operations 
(European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 
2014). 
According to the views of the US Coast Guard, 
as reported in the Homeland Security Office’s 
2004 fiscal report, the closure of major ports for 
a month could end diminish tens of billions of 
dollars, hinder trade and the US economy as a 
whole (Wrightson, 2005). The importance of the 
Croatian economy to the Adriatic Sea is 
needless to say, which is why issues relating to 
the protection of the Croatian part of the 
Adriatic Sea, ports, oil and gas platforms and 
other facilities of critical infrastructure against 
terrorism are of paramount importance for 















































                    
Technical Counterterrorism Measures in the Maritime 
There are a number of technical solutions that 
can be used to raise the level of security on 
ships, ports, oil and gas platforms, other critical 
maritime infrastructure facilities, and in general 
in maritime affairs. A more detailed description 
of these systems and their way of working 
would require special research, so here we will 
briefly list some of them. Warships have the 
option of using a specially designed virtual 
security shield16, while for passenger 
ships17there is a specially designed virtual 
security pertaining to cruise ships.  
Harbor facilities are generally vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks and are considered critical 
infrastructure facilities. Given their importance, 
they should be protected by early detection 
systems for security breaches, among which we 
especially mention: the security corridor 
system, the intelligent digital video surveillance 
system, the “friend or foe”system, the artificial 
door and artificial security shield. Container 
terminals can be specially protected by 
intermodal container exit systems, while fuel 
and hazardous cargoes are protected by 
specially designed safety systems for 
hazardous substances and fuel tank storage18. 
 
16 The attack on the American destroyer USS Cole in 
October 2000 showed the vulnerability of warships to the 
low-tech attacks of proximity suicide bomber during the fuel 
loading operation at the port. 
17 This system archives all events that can later serve as a 
response to forensics and subsequent event analysis, and 
also allows alerting and tracking of incidents such as “man 
at sea”. 
18 The HAZMAT system provides optical detection and multi-




































                                            
With the help of the following technical 
protection systems it is possible to: detect the 
entry of unauthorized personnel into the port 
area or on a ship; detecting unauthorized 
vehicles approaching a ship or working in a port 
area; supervise large specific areas of the 
protected territory; warn of threats to the facility 
or ship; register suspicious activities or work in 
the port area; track and classify people, 
vehicles and planes in low-flying; have a 
panoramic live image of the object in a 360 
degree view. Such systems maintain historical 
data and images that are automatically archived 
into easily accessible forensic database and 
subsequent event analysis. Audible and visual 
alarms equipped with such systems alert the 
staff responsible for the security of a particular 
facility. This system is easy to integrate devices 
that can be used to make sound notifications, 
but also flashing or any other device that is 
suitable for detecting activities and persons who 
may harm the security of a protected object 
(Goslin, 2008). 
Although they are of great use, technical 
measures themselves are not enough for an 
effective fight against maritime terrorism.  
Development of a crisis management system at sea  
Crisis management is very sensitive and 
complex, and the terrorist attacks on seafaring 
cause a number of crisis situations. 
biometric, radar, biological, meteorological, passive 















































In 2013, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) developed the concept of a 
new generation of NICs(Next Generation 
Incident Command System). The following 
year, NICS was used in more than 250 different 
US state organizations. This is a concept based 
on a multi-agency approach and supports 
decision-making.  
The team of experts from the Split company 
Portus et Navem, who participated in the work 
of the Second Zagreb Security Forum, are 
developing a Web application to address the 
crisis situations at sea. It is characterized by 
multi-agency multicriteria, different tools and 
decision-support algorithms in crisis situations. 
This program uses sophisticated computer 
management of human resources, technical 
vessels and equipment at sea. The interface 
between the system operator and the 
commander of the ship is easy and affordable, 
all in order to provide quick and easy 
communication. Resolving a security or 
ecological incident at sea is performed through 
the algorithm, using plans and procedures with 
a clear sequence of precisely defined orders.  
It is a new generation of systems that, using 
multicriteria analysis, represents a new, modern 
approach to managing risks and crises that 
pose the greatest risks to human lives, human 
health, the environment, and equally represents 
the added value of an effective response to the 
crisis within the European Union.  
Conclusion 
Since its inception, man has always had the 
need to sail, and the safety of navigation and 



































  Today 90% of the world’s trade takes place by 
sea. By using the research design used in this 
paper, we have been able to gain insight into 
the explored maritime terrorism problem and 
have proved that maritime affairs with all its 
critical infrastructure were indeed endangered 
by terrorism and will continue to pose as a 
target for terrorists in the future for many 
reasons.  
Using concrete examples, we have been able 
to provide the description of terrorist attacks 
showing that targets can be warships, tankers 
and ships for the carriage of passengers and 
vehicles. Furthermore, we have shown that no 
oil and gas platforms have been spared from 
terrorist attacks, as well as ports, port facilities 
and many other critical infrastructure facilities. 
By describing the possible scenarios, we have 
demonstrated ways to carry out terrorist attacks 
with or to ships, ports, and in general maritime 
affairs, and shown that these scenarios are very 
numerous and realistic, especially when 
considering the high level of specialization of 
individual organizations for attacks with 
maritime goals and critical infrastructure.  
Each scenario of potential terrorist attacks in 
the maritime sector involves significant human 
and material losses, major economic damage to 
critical infrastructure, energy supply disturbance 
and large pollution of the sea with catastrophic 
direct and indirect consequences. Terrorists are 
also aware of the fact that the attack on the 
large port area and all the relevant facilities of 
critical infrastructure can paralyze national 
economies and have a significant impact on 
world stock markets. As previously mentioned 
in the sector of the paper dealing with the 















































terrorism has tried to be prevented through the 
applications of this Code, however, terrorist 
acts are still taking place. We have particularly 
looked at the technical systems of maritime 
protection and critical infrastructure: warships, 
cruisers, and large ships for passenger and 
vehicle transport, and more technical systems 
for the protection of ports and port facilities and 
containers, pipelines, chemical and other 
dangerous cargoes placed therein. By using 
these technical solutions in synergy with other 
security measures and procedures such as 
providing naval navigation, tanker protection, 
LNG and LPG ships and other ships carrying 
strategic burdens, many terrorist attacks could 
in time be prevented, detected and stopped. 
Technical solutions that characterize a multi-
agency multicriteria approach and various tools 
and decision supporting algorithms in crisis 
situations are also being developed by Portus 
et Navem.  
Technology itself cannot ensure safety for ports 
and shipping, nor can it be achieved by 
implementing additional security procedures, 
physical barriers, or additional workforce to 
completely reduce the risk. An effective 
counterterrorism system in maritime affairs 
would be a complete, carefully planned 
approach which combines the greatest 
elements: technical, physical, procedural and 
informational security disciplines as a 
comprehensive whole. 
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